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Introduction to content security policy

By Mike West
Originally published June 15, 2012


Provides an overview of Content Security Policy (CSP)


Caution: This article discusses APIs that are not yet fully standardized and still in flux. Be cautious when using experimental APIs in your own projects.

The web’s security model is rooted in the same origin policy.

Code from should only have access to’s data, and should certainly never be allowed access. Each origin is kept isolated from the rest of the web, giving developers a safe sandbox in which to build and play. In theory, this is perfectly brilliant. In practice, attackers have found clever ways to subvert the system.

Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks, for example, bypass the same origin policy by tricking a site into delivering malicious code along with the intended content. This is a huge problem, as browsers trust all of the code that shows up on a page as being legitimately part of that page’s security origin. The XSS Cheat Sheet is an old but representative cross-section of the methods an attacker might use to violate this trust by injecting malicious code. If an attacker successfully injects any code at all, it’s pretty much game over: user session data is compromised and information that should be kept secret is exfiltrated to The Bad Guys™. We’d obviously like to prevent that if possible.

This tutorial highlights one promising new defense that can significantly reduce the risk and impact of XSS attacks in modern browsers: Content Security Policy (CSP).

Source Whitelists

The core issue exploited by XSS attacks is the browser’s inability to distinguish between script that’s intended to be part of your application, and script that’s been maliciously injected by a third-party. For example, the Google +1 button at the top of this article loads and executes code from in the context of this page’s origin. We trust that code, but we can’t expect the browser to figure out on it’s own that code from is awesome, while code from probably isn’t. The browser happily downloads and executes any code a page requests, regardless of source.

Instead of blindly trusting everything that a server delivers, CSP defines the Content-Security-Policy HTTP header that allows you to create a whitelist of sources of trusted content, and instructs the browser to only execute or render resources from those sources. Even if an attacker can find a hole through which to inject script, the script won’t match the whitelist, and therefore won’t be executed.

Since we trust to deliver valid code, and we trust ourselves to do the same, let’s define a policy that only allows script to execute when it comes from one of those two sources:

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'

Simple, right? As you probably guessed, script-src is a directive that controls a set of script-related privileges for a specific page. We’ve specified 'self' as one valid source of script, and as another. The browser will dutifully download and execute JavaScript from over HTTPS, as well as from the current page’s origin.

With this policy defined, the browser will simply throw an error instead of loading script from any other source. When a clever attacker does manage to inject code into your site, she’ll run headlong into an error message, rather than the success she was expecting:

Console error: "Refused to load the script '' because it violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "script-src 'self'"."

Policy applies to a wide variety of resources

While script resources are the most obvious security risks, CSP provides a rich set of policy directives that enable fairly granular control over the resources that a page is allowed to load. You’ve already seen script-src, so the concept should be clear. Let’s quickly walk through the rest of the resource directives:

  • connect-src limits the origins to which you can connect (via XHR, WebSockets, and EventSource).
  • font-src specifies the origins that can serve web fonts. Google’s Web Fonts could be enabled via font-src
  • frame-src lists the origins that can be embedded as frames. For example: frame-src would enable embedding YouTube videos, but no other origins.
  • img-src defines the origins from which images can be loaded.
  • media-src restricts the origins allowed to deliver video and audio.
  • object-src allows control over Flash and other plugins.
  • style-src is script-src’s counterpart for stylesheets.

By default, directives are wide open. If you don’t set a specific policy for a directive, let’s say font-src, then that directive behaves by default as though you’d specified * as the valid source (e.g. you could load fonts from everywhere, without restriction).

You can override this default behavior by specifying a default-src directive. This directive, as you might suspect, will define the defaults for any directive you leave unspecified. If default-src is set to, and you fail to specify a font-src directive, then you can load fonts from, and nowhere else. We specified only script-src in our earlier examples, which means that images, fonts, and so on can be loaded from any origin.

You can use as many or as few of these directives as makes sense for your specific application, simply listing each in the HTTP header, separating directives with semicolons. You’ll want to make sure that you list all required resources of a specific type in a single directive. If wrote something like script-src; script-src the second directive would simply be ignored. script-src would correctly specify both origins as valid.

If, for example, you have an application that loads all of it’s resources from a content delivery network (say,, and know that you don’t need framed content or any plugins at all, then your policy might look like the following:

Content-Security-Policy: default-src; frame-src 'none'; object-src 'none'

Implementation Details

Before moving further, it’s important to note that the canonical header I’ve used in the examples is Content-Security-Policy, but current browsers have implemented the feature behind a prefix: Firefox uses X-Content-Security-Policy, and WebKit-based browsers (Safari and Chrome) use X-WebKit-CSP. The implementations are quite similar, however, and are converging rapidly on the standard. This article will continue to use Content-Security-Policy, as browsers will migrate to that header, but the prefixes are essential for the moment.

Regardless of the header you use, policy is defined on a page-by-page basis: you’ll need to send the HTTP header along with every response that you’d like to ensure is protected. This provides a lot of flexibility, as you can fine-tune the policy for specific pages based on their specific needs. Perhaps one set of pages in your site has a +1 button, while others don’t: you could allow the button code to be loaded only when necessary.

The source list in each directive is fairly flexible. You can specify sources by scheme (data:, https:), or ranging in specificity from hostname-only (, which matches any origin on that host: any scheme, any port) to a fully qualified URI (, which matches only HTTPS, only, and only port 443). Wildcards are accepted, but only as a scheme, a port, or in the leftmost position of the hostname:


Would match all sub domains of (but not itself), using any scheme, on any port.

Four keywords are also accepted in the source list:

  • 'none', as you might expect, matches nothing.
  • 'self' matches the current origin, but not its subdomains.
  • 'unsafe-inline' allows inline JavaScript and CSS (we’ll touch on this in more detail in a bit).
  • 'unsafe-eval' allows text-to-JavaScript mechanisms like eval (we’ll get to this too).

These keywords require single-quotes. script-src 'self' authorizes the execution of JavaScript from the current host. script-src self allows JavaScript from a server named “self” (and not from the current host), which probably isn’t what you meant.


There’s one more directive worth talking about: sandbox. It’s a bit different than the others we’ve looked at, as is places restrictions on actions the page can take, rather than on resources that the page can load. If the sandbox directive is present, the page will be treated as though it was loaded inside of an iframe with a sandbox attribute. This can have a wide range of effects on the page: forcing the page into a unique origin, and preventing form submission, among others. It’s a bit beyond the scope of this article, but you can find full details on valid sandboxing attributes in the “sandboxing flag set” section of the HTML5 spec.

Inline Code Considered Harmful

It should be clear that CSP is based on whitelisting origins, as that’s an unambiguous way of instructing the browser to treat specific sets of resources as acceptable and to reject the rest. Origin-based whitelisting doesn’t, however, solve the biggest threat posed by XSS attacks: inline script injection. If an attacker can inject a script tag that directly contains some malicious payload;


The browser has no mechanism by which to distinguish it from a legitimate inline script tag. CSP solves this problem by banning inline script entirely: it’s the only way to be sure.

This ban includes not only scripts embedded directly in script tags, but also inline event handlers and javascript: URLs. You’ll need to move the content of script tags into an external file, and replace javascript: URLs and <a ... onclick="[JAVASCRIPT]"> with appropriate addEventListener calls. For example, you might rewrite the following from:

      function doAmazingThings() {
          alert('YOU AM AMAZING!');
  <button onclick='doAmazingThings();'>Am I amazing?</button>

Into something more like:

  <!-- amazing.html -->
  <script src='amazing.js'></script>
  <button id='amazing'>Am I amazing?</button>
  // amazing.js
  function doAmazingThings() {
   alert('YOU AM AMAZING!');
  document.addEventListener('DOMContentReady', function () {
           .addEventListener('click', doAmazingThings);

The rewritten code has a number of advantages above and beyond working well with CSP; it’s already best practice, regardless of your use of CSP. Inline JavaScript mixes structure and behavior in exactly the way you shouldn’t. External resources are easier for browsers to cache, more understandable for developers, and conducive to compilation and minification. You’ll write better code if you do the work to move code into external resources.

Inline style is treated in the same way: both the style attribute and style tags should be consolidated into external stylesheets to protect against a variety of surprisingly clever data exfiltration methods that CSS enables.

If you really, absolutely must have inline script and style, you can enable it by adding 'unsafe-inline' as an allowed source in a script-src or style-src directive. But please don’t. Banning inline script is the biggest security win CSP provides, and banning inline style likewise hardens your application. It’s a little bit of effort up front to ensure that things work correctly after moving all the code out-of-line, but that’s a tradeoff that’s well worth making.

Eval Too

Even when an attacker can’t inject script directly, she might be able to trick your application into converting otherwise inert text into executable JavaScript and executing it on her behalf. eval(), new Function(), setTimeout([string], ...), and setInterval([string], ...) are all vectors through which injected text might end up executing something unexpectedly malicious. CSP’s default response to this risk is, unsurprisingly, to block all of these vectors completely.

This has a more than few impacts on the way you build applications:

  • Parse JSON via the built-in JSON.parse, rather than relying on eval. Native JSON operations are available in every browser since IE8, and they’re completely safe.
  • Rewrite any setTimeout or setInterval calls you’re currently making with inline functions rather than strings. For example:
  setTimeout("document.querySelector('a').style.display = 'none';", 10);

would be better written as:

  setTimeout(function () {
     document.querySelector('a').style.display = 'none';
  }, 10);
  • Avoid inline templating at runtime: Many templating libraries use new Function() liberally to speed up template generation at runtime. It’s a nifty application of dynamic programming, but comes at the risk of evaluating malicious text. Some frameworks support CSP out of the box, falling back to a robust parser in the absence of eval AngularJS’s ng-csp directive is a good example of this.

You’re even better off, however, if your templating language of choice offers precompilation (Handlebars does, for instance). Precompiling your templates can make the user experience even faster than the fastest runtime implementation, and it’s safer too. Win, win! If eval and its text-to-JavaScript brethren are completely essential to your application, you can enable them by adding 'unsafe-eval' as an allowed source in a script-src directive. But, again, please don’t. Banning the ability to execute strings makes it much more difficult for an attacker to execute unauthorized code on your site.


CSP’s ability to block untrusted resources client-side is a huge win for your users, but it would be quite helpful indeed to get some sort of notification sent back to the server so that you can identify and squash any bugs that allow malicious injection in the first place. To this end, you can instruct the browser to POST JSON-formatted violation reports to a location specified in a report-uri directive.

  Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; ...; report-uri /my_amazing_csp_report_parser;

Those reports will look something like the following:

   "csp-report": {
     "document-uri": "",
     "referrer": "",
     "blocked-uri": "",
     "violated-directive": "script-src 'self'",
     "original-policy": "script-src 'self'; report-uri"

It contains a good chunk of information that will help you track down the specific cause of the violation, including the page on which the violation occurred (document-uri), that page’s referrer (referrer, note that the key is not misspelled), the resource that violated the page’s policy (blocked-uri), the specific directive it violated (violated-directive), and the page’s complete policy (original-policy).


If you’re just starting out with CSP, it makes sense to evaluate the current state of your application before rolling out a draconian policy to your users. As a stepping stone to a complete deployment, you can ask the browser to monitor a policy, reporting violations, but not enforcing the restrictions. Instead of sending a Content-Security-Policy header, send a Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only header.

  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; ...; report-uri /my_amazing_csp_report_parser;

The policy specified in report-only mode won’t block restricted resources, but it will send violation reports to the location you specify. You can even send both headers, enforcing one policy while monitoring another. This is a great way to evaluate the effect of changes to your application’s CSP: turn on reporting for a new policy, monitor the violation reports and fix any bugs that turn up, then start enforcing the new policy once you’re satisfied with its effect.

Real World Usage

CSP is quite usable in Chrome 16+ and Firefox 4+, and it’s expected to gain at least limited support in IE 10. Safari’s current implementation is lacking, but WebKit nightlies work just as well as Chrome, so there’s hope for the next iteration of Safari. Massive sites like Twitter have deployed the header (Twitter’s case study is worth a read), and the standard is very much ready for you to start playing around on your own sites.

The first step towards crafting a policy for your application is to evaluate the resources you’re actually loading. Once you think you have a handle on how things are put together in your app, set up a policy based on those requirements. Let’s walk through a few common use-cases, and determine how we’d best be able to support them within the protective confines of CSP:

Use Case #1: Social media widgets

  • Google’s +1 button includes script from, and embeds an iframe from You’ll need a policy that includes both these origins in order to embed the button. A minimal policy would be script-src; frame-src You’ll also need to ensure that the snippet of JavaScript that Google provides is pulled out into an external JavaScript file.
  • Facebook’s Like button has a number of implementation options. I’d recommend sticking with the iframe version, as it’s safely sandboxed from the rest of your site. That would require a frame-src directive to function properly. Note that, by default, the iframe code Facebook provides loads a relative URL, // Please change that to explicitly specify HTTPS: There’s no reason to use HTTP if you don’t have to.
  • Twitter’s Tweet button relies on access to a script and frame, both hosted at (Twitter likewise provides a relative URL by default: please edit the code to specify HTTPS when copy/pasting it locally). You’ll be all set with script-src; frame-src, as long as you move the JavaScript snippet Twitter provides out into an external JavaScript file.
  • Other platforms will have similar requirements, and can be addressed similarly. I’d suggest just setting a default-src of 'none', and watching your console to determine which resources you’ll need to enable to make the widgets work.

Including multiple widgets is straightforward: simply combine the policy directives, remembering to merge all resources of a single type into a single directive. If you wanted all three, the policy would look like:

script-src; frame-src

Use Case #2: Lockdown

Assume for a moment that you run a banking site, and want to make very sure that only those resources you’ve written yourself can be loaded. In this scenario, start with a default policy that blocks absolutely everything (default-src 'none'), and build up from there.

Let’s say the bank loads all images, style, and script from a CDN at, and connects via XHR to to pull various bits of data down. Frames are used, but only for pages local to the site (no third-party origins). There’s no Flash on the site, no fonts, no nothing. The most restrictive CSP header that we could send in this scenario is:

  Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src; style-src; img-src; connect-src; frame-src 'self'

Use Case #3: SSL Only

A wedding-ring discussion forum admin wants to ensure that all resources are only loaded via secure channels, but doesn’t really write much code; rewriting large chunks of the third-party forum software that’s filled to the brim with inline script and style is beyond his abilities. The following policy would be effective:

  Content-Security-Policy: default-src https:; script-src https: 'unsafe-inline'; style-src https: 'unsafe-inline'

Even though https: was specified in default-src, the script and style directives don’t automatically inherit that source. Each directive overwrites the default completely for that specific type of resource.

The Future

The W3C’s Web Application Security Working Group is working through the details of the Content Security Policy specification, and a 1.0 version containing the functionality outlined in this article is fairly close to moving to Last Call. The group isn’t sitting around patting themselves on the back, however: CSP 1.1 is being actively discussed on the public-webappsec@ mailing list, and browser vendors are hard at work solidifying and improving their implementations.

CSP 1.1 has a few interesting bits on the drawing board, a few are worth highlighting here:

  • Policy injection via meta tags: CSP’s preferred delivery mechanism is an HTTP header. It can be very useful, however, to set a policy on a page directly in the markup, or via script. There’s some healthy debate about whether or not setting policy from within the same document to which the policy should apply, but it appears to have a solid enough use-case to make it into the next iteration. The meta element portion of the spec is far enough along that WebKit has already implemented the feature, so you can play around with it now in Chrome: throw
  <meta http-equiv="X-WebKit-CSP" content="[POLICY GOES HERE]">
in the head of your document, and you’re good to go.You can even inject a policy at runtime by adding the meta tag via script. A good first step towards a fully locked-down application is to inject an appropriate policy after your application has loaded all the resources it needs, and “booted up”. This gives you a mostly secure site (there’s still significant risk of attack during this vulnerable phase), but allows you to reap some of the advantage of CSP while migrating to the HTTP header.
  • DOM API: If this feature makes it into the next iteration of CSP, you’ll have the ability to query a page’s current policy via JavaScript, which will enable you to make runtime decisions about implementations, and gracefully settle on something that will work for the environment in which your code finds itself. If eval() is available, for example, your code might implement some feature differently. This will be particularly useful for framework authors; the API spec is still very much in flux, and you’ll find the most up-to-date iteration in the “Script Interfaces” section of the draft spec.

  • New directives: A variety of new directives are being discussed, including script-nonce, which would enable inline script only for explicitly specified script elements; plugin-types, which would limit the MIME types of content for which plugins could be loaded; form-action, which would allow form submission to only specific origins; and a few others that are currently less completely specified.

If you’re interested in the discussion around these upcoming features, skim the mailing list archives, or join in yourself.